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HEURISTICS, BIASES, AND CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS
CHAD M. OLDFATHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive science teaches us that most people, much of the time, act
in ways that systematically depart from the behavior of a purely rational
actor.' In the past fifteen years, scholars have used this core insight not
only as the basis for critique of law and economics-based analyses, but
also as the foundation of its own distinct approach to legal problems.
The resulting literature is robust and stimulating, and "behavioral law
and economics" has contributed to virtually every field of legal inquiry.
I am in favor of drawing on psychology's insights to enrich legal
scholarship and practice, and generally applaud the effort to strengthen
the connection between reality and critique.2 My purpose here is simply
to use this symposium's discussion of plea bargaining to introduce a note
of caution with respect to the application of this research to the
workings of the criminal justice system, and in particular with respect to
the behavior of criminal defendants.
As most of the commentators who have applied behavioral law and
economics to the plea bargaining process have pointed out, what results
appears to present something of a puzzle. A straightforward application
of the heuristics and biases literature leads to the conclusion that plea
bargaining should occur only rarely.3 That, of course, does not accord
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. Thanks to Michael O'Hear for
providing helpful comments on a prior draft.
1. See generally REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD (2001).
2. Indeed, I have relied on psychology in my own work. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather,
Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
3. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2497 (2004) (noting the tendency of heuristics, biases, and related phenomena to
"cause defendants to lean against plea bargaining and toward going to trial"); Richard Birke,
Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 207 (noting that the
practice of plea bargaining appears to contradict the principle of loss aversion); Russell
Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 213, 215 (2007) ("Were one to form predictions about plea bargaining based
only on cognitive research, it would be logical to expect plea bargaining to be a rare
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with reality, in which plea bargaining accounts for the resolution of the
vast majority of all criminal cases.4 Scholars have accordingly set about
the task of identifying the aspects of the system that apparently
overwhelm the cognitive forces that would otherwise compel defendants
to refuse to plea bargain.
My goal in this Essay is to suggest an alternative possibility, namely
that the teachings of behavioral law and economics may not apply as
forcefully or consistently to criminal defendants as to other legal actors.
This might be so for two reasons. First, it might be inappropriate to
apply the heuristics and biases literature to criminal defendants at all
(or, at least, to all classes of criminal defendants), for the simple reason
that criminal defendants, as a distinct subset of the population, may
differ in material ways from the populations on which the heuristics and
biases research is based. Second, the situational nature of human
behavior counsels against the straightforward application of behavioral
law and economics principles to defendants' behavior inside the context
of the criminal justice system. While prior work applying behavioral
economics to plea bargaining recognizes these possibilities, it has failed
to pursue either in detail.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part II briefly
outlines prior efforts to apply the insights of behavioral economics to
the plea bargaining process. Part III considers the possibility that the
research on heuristics and biases does not apply to criminal defendants,
or at least not as forcefully or consistently as it applies to the
populations on which the research is based. Part IV takes up the
alternative possibility that, even if criminal defendants as a class are as
susceptible to cognitive shortcomings as the rest of us, situational
considerations might lead criminal defendants acting within the context
of the criminal justice system to behave in ways that are inconsistent
with the predictions of behavioral economics.
II. HEURISTICS, BIASES, AND PLEA BARGAINING: THE
"TRADITIONAL" STORY
It may be premature to speak of a "traditional" story about the
application of behavioral economics to plea bargaining. Nonetheless,
prior work on the topic includes enough consistency to allow for the
tentative articulation of a traditional account, which goes something like
occurrence."); Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003).
4. Covey, supra note 3, at 215.
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this: People are, as Herbert Simon famously phrased it, "boundedly
rational."5 Simply put, we lack the cognitive capacity to undertake the
analyses necessary to be fully rational with respect to all of our choices
and actions.6 As a consequence, we tend to rely on certain mental
shortcuts-heuristics-that generate behavior that, while often at least
roughly in accord with the prescriptions of rationality, will systematically
depart from it in significant ways.7 And we are susceptible to certain
distortions in our thought-biases-that render us unable to rationally
assess the information with which we are presented.8
Scholars applying this research to plea bargaining have concluded
that plea bargaining seemingly ought not to occur as frequently as it
does.9 Criminal defendants, the reasoning goes, are loss averse'0 like the
rest of us, meaning that they (and we) are more willing to take risks to
avoid a loss than we rationally should be." Because a plea bargain
typically involves accepting a loss of liberty, and forgoing the chance to
avoid the loss by going to trial, we should expect plea bargains to occur
only rarely. 2 What is more, other cognitive shortcomings seemingly pull
in the same direction. Psychology suggests that people tend toward
overconfidence in the face of uncertain outcomes, and to interpret
information in self-serving ways."' As a consequence, we can expect
individual defendants to be inclined to believe that they stand a
5. HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 19-23 (1983).
6. For a more nuanced discussion of the meaning of "bounded rationality," see Gerd
Gigerenzer, Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 17, 22-24 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel
eds., 2006). As Greg Mitchell points out, the account that I have provided above, though it is
typical of such accounts in the legal literature, overlooks a distinction between the "bounded
rationality" concept and the account of error underlying heuristics and biases research. See
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the
New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1923 n.23 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1085-
90 (2000) (discussing the availability and representativeness heuristics).
8. See, e.g., id. at 1091-1100 (discussing the overconfidence, self-serving, and hindsight
biases).
9. See Birke, supra note 3, at 207; Bibas, supra note 3, at 2497. Bibas argues that, in the
aggregate, the ninety-four to ninety-five percent of defendants who plead guilty is not
necessarily too high or too low, but rather that the defendants' psychological irrationality in
decision making affects the distribution of and inequities among individual defendants'
sentences. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2497.
10. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2507-12.
11. Birke, supra note 3, at 207, 212.
12. Id. at 219.
13. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2498-2502; Covey, supra note 3, at 218; Weinstein, supra note
3, at 813-15.
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relatively good chance of prevailing at trial, and to have difficulty
viewing the evidence in their case in an objective manner.'4 Other
phenomena, such as denial mechanisms, discounting of future costs,
fairness bias, framing, and anchoring, might likewise lead defendants to
be disinclined to plea. 5 In sum, as Russell Covey puts it, "[w]ere one to
form predictions about plea bargaining based only on cognitive
research, it would be logical to expect plea bargaining to be a rare
occurrence." 
16
Such predictions, of course, would immediately run into trouble with
reality, in which over ninety percent of all criminal cases are resolved by
plea bargain.'7 The question for scholars, then, has become how to
reconcile the predictions of theory with the facts of practice, and
whether we can identify the apparently powerful force(s) suppressing
the tendency to resist plea bargaining. Richard Birke implicates
criminal defense attorneys, who he asserts succumb to systemic coercion
to "provide information about the expected value of trial that is too
rudimentary to present an accurate picture to the defendant of the value
of trial"'8 and who take advantage of framing effects to present
prosecutorial offers as being more favorable than they really are.' 9
Covey points to plea discounts and trial penalties," the framing effects
of pretrial detention, and the psychic and other costs of continued
participation in the criminal justice process,2' and likewise identifies the
pressures faced by defense counsel.22  Stephanos Bibas and Ian
Weinstein have taken the prevalence of plea bargaining as a given,
focusing instead on the inequitable results that might follow from the
operation of heuristics and biases23 and urging defense counsel to be
14. For example, Weinstein's article is built around the story of a former client of his, a
defendant in a drug case, who seized on the fact that the complaint stated that the police
seized a box full of cocaine from him, when in fact it was a bag. Weinstein, supra note 3, at
783-87. The client viewed this inconsistency as establishing reasonable doubt, and Weinstein
recounts his job as, among other things, requiring him to get his client to recognize that the
jury would be much more likely to focus on the five kilograms of cocaine inside the bag,
rather than on the fact that it wasn't a box. Id.
15. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2502-19; see also Covey, supra note 3, at 221-23.
16. Covey, supra note 3, at 215.
17. Birke, supra note 3, at 207.
18. Id. at 209; see also id. at 232-33 (expanding on this explanation by positing that
defense attorneys face institutional pressure to produce guilty pleas and to avoid trials).
19. Id. at 209, 232-34.
20. Covey, supra note 3, at 224-33.
21. Id. at 239-43.
22. Id. at 243-45.
23. See Bibas, supra note 3. at 2529-30 (suggesting that demographic variation in
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mindful of their presence and to view debiasing as a central component
of their role.24
Assuming heuristics and biases manifest themselves in typical ways
in criminal defendants acting in the context of the criminal justice
system, these are perfectly plausible accounts of the factors at play. And
I wish to make clear that I take no position on whether those
assumptions will ultimately prove correct. I do, however, believe there
is good reason for skepticism, as I will outline below.
III. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COGNITION AND THE (POSSIBLY)
SPECIAL CASE OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
Behavioral law and economics replaces one model incorporating an
assumption about human behavior-that people act rationally-with
another that likewise incorporates an assumption about human
behavior-that people act irrationally in predictable ways. 25  Both
involve generalizations: just as no economist even minimally attentive to
the people around him (or, for that matter, to himself) could defend the
proposition that people always act rationally, neither can anyone
familiar with the research on which behavioral law and economics rests
defend the proposition that people always act irrationally in the ways
identified by that research.26 Indeed, most legal scholars relying upon
behavioral economics recognize this and offer at least perfunctory
qualifications in their introductions of the research.27
To appreciate the significance of this point, it is important to
recognize that the phenomena of heuristics, biases, and the like are
generalizations. As such, it is perhaps fair to say that most people are
susceptible to them most of the time.28 That does not, of course, rule out
susceptibility to heuristics and biases "can lead to some truly perverse results, such as larger
plea-bargain discounts to induce pleas from worse offenders").
24. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2544-45; Weinstein, supra note 3, at 817-33.
25. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 1074-75.
26. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 83-87
(2002).
27. See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1722-24 (2003) (providing examples of articles in
which legal scholars have recognized individual variations in susceptibility to departures from
rationality).
28. And even that may be too strong a characterization. As Greg Mitchell has pointed
out,
because behavioral decision researchers are interested primarily in finding
deviations from norms of procedural rationality by any statistically
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the possibility of individual differences in terms of susceptibility to these
phenomena, nor that certain subsets of the population might, in general,
be more or less susceptible to them. As Greg Mitchell notes:
Research tells us that cognitive biases do not affect us all
with uncanny consistency. In particular, differences in
education, training, cognitive capacity, thinking
dispositions, sex, and cultural background across
individuals appear to be reliably associated with different
levels of cognitive performance. Furthermore, emotional
differences, developmental differences, and different
modes of mental processing appear to be associated with
different levels of cognitive performance within
individuals. Therefore, depending on the characteristics
of the individual and the system of thought activated in a
particular decisionmaking situation, the behavior of
different groups of individuals and the behavior of the
same individual over time may vary considerably, from
perfect rationality to seeming irrationality.29
Susceptibility to biases is therefore not uniformly distributed among
the general population. If we assume" that such susceptibility to biases
is normally distributed throughout the population, we would find, to
state things very simplistically, that most people are somewhat
susceptible, with a few people being extremely susceptible and an equal
portion being hardly susceptible at all. Breaking out the subpopulations
that Mitchell identifies would lead to distributions that would perhaps
still follow a bell curve, but which would center around higher or lower
significant percentage of subjects (that is, they seek to find nonrandom
deviations from the neoclassical economic model, and a small percentage
who deviate may suffice for purposes of statistical analysis), an
experiment often will be portrayed as having found some "systematic non-
rational tendency" even though less than half of the subjects provided the
nonrational response in the experiment.
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 86 n.46. Mitchell's critique goes even further than the one here, to
call into question more generally the appropriateness of behavioral economics as a source of
insights relevant to the legal system. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1912-13 ("A rational
review of the evidence on human judgment and decision making should lead one to
agnosticism rather than empirical certainty on the matter of the rationality or irrationality of
legal decision making.").
29. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 87.
30. I am aware of no evidence based on which to assert that what follows is anything
more than an assumption.
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means measured in terms of susceptibility. My point here is not to
achieve any sort of statistical realism, but rather to illustrate the basic
idea that, within the population as a whole, (i) individuals will vary in
their susceptibility to biases, and (ii) subpopulations will vary in their
susceptibility to biases such that the average individual members of a
given population will be more (or less, as the case may be) susceptible to
biases compared to the average member of the population as a whole
and other subpopulations.
When we are studying criminal defendants, of course, we are
concerned with a unique subpopulation. Prior work applying behavioral
economics to plea bargaining partially recognizes the possibility that
criminal defendants may, as a class, differ from the general population
in terms of the extent to which heuristics and biases hold sway over their
thought processes. Stephanos Bibas, for example, not only posits that
"[m]ost criminals are less risk averse (at least with regard to
imprisonment) than law-abiding citizens,"3 but also recognizes that
cognitive performance varies along with a host of other demographic
factors.32
My aim here is simply to press this point further. There is good
reason to suspect that the distribution of susceptibility to cognitive
biases among criminal defendants would diverge significantly from the
distribution amongst the general population, as well as from other
subpopulations defined so as to include both defendants and
nondefendants. The basis for this suggestion is the observation that
criminal defendants-at least insofar as they are guilty-have engaged
in behavior that departs from core social norms, and that indicates that
they do not respond to society's various schemes of rewards and
punishments in the way that the rest of us do. This, too, is no doubt an
overgeneralization, given the varying sorts of conduct that can lead to
criminal sanction.33 But the point remains that criminal defendants
occupy a far end of the distribution amongst the population of an
attribute that we might call "criminality," and that their presence on the
far reaches of this distribution implies the possibility of statistical
31. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2509-10.
32. Id. at 2502, 2511-12.
33. "Despite the debate about specialisation among criminals, and the persisting interest
in antisocial personality, the evidence indicates that offenders are heterogeneous in
personality . . . . The assumption of a distinct "criminal personality" is therefore
questionable, and comparison of unselected offenders with nonoffenders is likely to be a
strategy with limited payoffs." RONALD BLACKBURN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL
CONDUCT: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 186 (1993).
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atypicality on other measures of behavior as well, including
susceptibility to heuristics and biases. Further refinement in the
definition of the subpopulations under analysis-into categories such as
violent criminals, sexual offenders, white collar criminals, and so on-
might reveal even greater variance in cognitive style.
Although the causes of crime remain, to a large degree, a mystery,3
4
prior research has revealed all sorts of ways in which offenders differ
from nonoffenders. Among other things, criminals tend to be of below-
average intelligence,35 to have poor impulse control,36 to have low self-
esteem,37 and to suffer from a relative lack of interpersonal problem-
solving skills.38 In short, "[p]eople who break the law are often
psychologically atypical. This is not to say they are necessarily sick
(although some are), or that atypicality of any sort characterizes every
single lawbreaker. Rather, the evidence says that populations of
offenders differ statistically in various respects from populations of
nonoffenders.
'39
As a result, any attempt to draw conclusions about the behavior of
criminal defendants from basic behavioral economics research should
remain qualified. It may turn out to be that whatever factors underlie
34. Blackburn notes:
Research on the personality of criminals has employed more than a
hundred psychological tests.. . but while most studies comparing criminal
samples with controls on standardised measures have identified significant
differences, these have not always been replicated. Some reviewers
therefore remain skeptical about whether differences found shed any light
on the personal antecedents of crime, and conceptual and methodological
shortcomings pervade much of this area of research.
Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 186-91; ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER 241 (1993) ("One strong and consistent finding is that
both delinquents and criminals have relatively lower IQs; the finding that verbal IQ in
particular is compromised in antisocial groups is suggestive of left hemisphere dysfunction
and a disruption of language processing."); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN,
CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 27 (1985) ("There is mounting evidence that, on the average,
offenders differ from nonoffenders in physique, intelligence, and personality. Some of these
differences may not themselves be a cause of crime but only a visible indicator of some other
factor that does contribute to crime.").
36. BLACKBURN, supra note 33, at 191-96.
37. Id. at 197-200. But see DAVID FARABEE, RETHINKING REHABILITATION: WHY
CAN'T WE REFORM OUR CRIMINALS? 44 (2005) (asserting a lack of "reliable evidence
linking low self-esteem to criminality").
38. BLACKBURN, supra note 33, at 206-07; RAINE, supra note 35, at 241.
39. WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 173.
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criminality bear no relation to one's susceptibility to cognitive biases.
On the other hand, it might be that criminal defendants are either more
or less susceptible to thought based in heuristics and biases as compared
to the general population. And it may well be that some subset of the
criminal population is so psychologically atypical that an entirely
different model of thought is required to account for its members'
behavior. Any of these latter possibilities could have significant
implications for a complete understanding of the dynamics of plea
bargaining, and accordingly for the nature and form of any prescriptive
recommendations based on the research.
IV. THE SITUATIONAL NATURE OF BEHAVIOR
A second reason to be cautious in relying too heavily on existing
cognitive science research in the plea bargaining environment stems
from the importance of context. Different types of situations can lead to
different types of thought.40 As Russell Covey highlights, the situation
faced by a criminal defendant presented with the choice of whether to
accept a plea bargain is more than marginally unusual as a decisional
situation; the defendant may well be incarcerated and certainly must
contend with nontrivial procedural hassles in order to exercise the
choice.4' What is more, a defendant faced with a plea offer is unlikely to
make the decision whether to take it alone. He will be represented by
counsel and will likely decide to accept only after consulting with others.
Both of these features counsel against the easy application of behavioral
economics in the plea bargaining context.
Start with the situation faced by a defendant engaging in plea
bargaining. Even if we assume that it is only the defendant's
susceptibility to biases that need concern us, there is reason to suspect
that the context will affect it. It may well be that criminals, and
therefore most criminal defendants, are impulsive risk-takers in most
contexts in the real world. If those traits are constant, we might expect
(consistent with the traditional story outlined above) defendants to be
relatively more confident in their ability to prevail at trial and relatively
more willing to risk a larger penalty in return for the chance to escape
punishment altogether. But if I may engage briefly in the vice of
40. See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 109 ("[W]hen we broaden our view to include
research into the effects of situational variables on judgment and decisionmaking, we see that
people do not exhibit the same behavioral tendencies across situations, whether the tendency
is towards rationality or irrationality.").
41. See Covey, supra note 3, at 237-41.
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anecdote, my own experience as a public defender does not support the
conclusion that overconfidence afflicts most defendants. To be sure,
because I did appellate and post-conviction work, my clientele was not
representative of all criminal defendants.42 That said, the psychological
term that most readily comes to my mind as an accurate descriptor of
their mental state vis-A-vis the criminal justice system is "learned
helplessness." The phrase refers to the passiveness one develops in
response to a situation one perceives as uncontrollable." Although
some of my clients undoubtedly were overconfident and under the sway
of the self-serving bias, most seemed quite strongly to hold a belief that
they would not be treated fairly by the system and that they would lose
no matter what they did. '  In short, we ought to be cautious about
concluding that a preference for risk "on the street" translates into a
preference for risk in the environment of the criminal justice system.
Defendants might instead be characterized by fatalism or passivity,
which could result in a failure even to attempt considered analysis of a
plea bargain offer."
42. My clients did include defendants who had entered guilty pleas and who were
appealing their sentences. My sense is that these clients were no more or less likely than their
counterparts who had lost at trial to believe that they had been "railroaded."
43. Stated more precisely:
The cornerstone of the hypothesis is that learning that outcomes are
uncontrollable results in three deficits: motivational, cognitive and
emotional. The hypothesis is "cognitive" in that it postulates that mere
exposure to uncontrollability is not sufficient to render an organism
helpless; rather, the organism must come to expect that outcomes are
uncontrollable in order to exhibit helplessness. In brief, the motivational
deficit consists of retarded initiation of voluntary responses and is seen as
a consequence of the expectation that outcomes are uncontrollable. If the
organism expects that its responses will not affect some outcome, then the
likelihood of emitting such responses decreases. Second, the learned
helplessness hypothesis argues that learning that an outcome is
uncontrollable results in a cognitive deficit since such learning makes it
difficult to later learn that responses produce that outcome. Finally, the
learned helplessness hypothesis claims that depressed affect is a
consequence of learning that outcomes are uncontrollable.
Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49, 50 (1978).
44. Relatedly, as my colleague Michael O'Hear points out, the absence of fair process in
the typical plea bargaining process tends to leave defendants with the perception that
outcomes will likewise be unfair. See Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
45. The effect could play out in other ways as well, such as by affecting emotional state,
which can in turn affect reasoning. See Bryan Myers et al., Psychology Weighs in on the
Debate Surrounding Victim Impact Statements and Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors
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Another significant situational constraint arises out of the fact that
the decision whether to accept a plea bargain is not likely to be an
individual decision in a strict sense. The presence of defense counsel is
likely to affect the manner in which any biases play out, as Bibas, Birke,
and Weinstein acknowledge. 6 Indeed, given that defense counsel will
typically be the repeat player who is best positioned to assess a plea
offer and the person who must decide whether to recommend that offer
to her client, there may be a real sense in which it is the lawyer's
susceptibility to heuristics and biases that we ought to be concerned
about.47 But even that is undoubtedly too narrow a conception of the
decisional process. A defendant faced with a plea deal is likely to
consult with family, friends, and fellow inmates before making his
decision.' In contrast to the sorts of well-defined, individual decisions
made under fixed time constraints on which the behavioral economics
literature is largely based, plea bargains present complex decisions
typically made over a relatively lengthy time span after consultation
with a potentially large group of people. Each one of these distinctions
presents a possible roadblock to the easy application of heuristics and
biases research to plea bargaining. It is not yet clear, for example, how
41group deliberation affects the operation of these cognitive processes.
A defendant contemplating a plea offer may, as a result, be more or less
susceptible to cognitive bias, and the underlying research provides us no
easy means to tell which will be the case. Alternatively, the serious
consequences attached to plea bargaining, coupled with the often
relatively leisurely pace at which the decision whether to take a plea
Really Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 13, 16-17 (2006).
46. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2519-27; Birke, supra note 3, at 209; Weinstein, supra
note 3, at 786-87.
47. See, e.g., Plea Bargaining from the Criminal Lawyer's Perspective: Plea Bargaining in
Wisconsin, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 357, 370 (2007) (comments of Dean Strang) ("I can dress this
up so that you don't all think I'm violating the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct, but I
decide whether the client is taking this plea agreement. I decide it nearly 100% of the
time."); id. at 371 (comments of Deja Vishny) ("I agree that I'm mostly the decision maker. I
don't think it's 100% of the time. In other words, I have had clients decline to do what I
thought probably would have been a better outcome for them. But one of the things that I
have found is that although I may be the decision maker, it's done by empowering the client
to come to the best decision for their case.").
48. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 830 (relating the story of a client who had discussed his
situation with fellow inmates and decided to take a plea deal based in part on their assertion
that "[n]obody wins" at trial).
49. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 2004 ("In some cases, group deliberations and
collective decision making moderate bias, in some cases they have no apparent net effect, and
in some cases they amplify bias.").
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offer is made, may mean that defendants make the decision via a more
systematic mode of thought that, while not always leading to full
rationality, is not subject to the sorts of regularized errors resulting from
heuristic thought.0
V. CONCLUSION
Although I have expressed some skepticism regarding the use of
behavioral economics in the analysis of plea bargaining, I do not wish to
convey the sentiment that the exercise is misguided or not worthwhile.
The critiques I have articulated do not undermine the value of
behavioral economics as the foundation of a powerful critique of
rational choice depictions of the plea bargaining process. Nor do I mean
to suggest that useful models of plea bargaining cannot be developed
based on behavioral economics. In constructing such models, however,
scholars must remain mindful of the fact that the greater descriptive
accuracy provided by behavioral economics might be more apparent
than real, and might mask some substantial blind spots which ought to
be taken into account in any model or prescriptive recommendation.
In the end, the situation presents a variant of what Adrian Vermeule
has termed "the institutionalist dilemma":51 we cannot escape the need
50. Id. at 2013 (discussing the work of psychologists). Mitchell suggests that:
[I]nstead of always relying on the same cognitive mechanisms to process
information, people sometimes engage in thought processes more closely
approximating normatively rational decision strategies (which may lead to
random errors when people have insufficient processing resources),
whereas at other times people engage in thought processes utilizing
"arational" heuristics (which typically lead to "good" choices but may be
more prone to nonrandom errors.)
Id.; see also id. at 2011-17 (discussing the tendency in the behavioral law and economics
literature to overlook the possibility that thought might be more than unimodal); id. at 2005-
11 (discussing the variability of framing effects and the apparent situationality of risk-aversion
and risk-seeking).
51. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3 (2006). Vermeule's project is directed at judges
choosing an interpretive approach, but the core dynamic inheres in nearly every question of
institutional design in the legal system.
The sheer complexity of the legal system means that the empirical
questions at issue are often "trans-scientific": although they are empirical
in principle, they are unresolvable at acceptable cost within any
reasonable time frame. Worse, judges are boundedly rational: their
capacity to process the information they can obtain is limited, in part
because of cognitive failings. While those failings are shared by all
decisionmakers, they are exacerbated by the case-by-case decisionmaking
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to choose a framework in which plea bargaining takes place, and must
do so without the information necessary to be certain that our chosen
design will not unacceptably distort the results it generates. We must
accordingly be mindful of the potential unintended consequences of
reform proposals, and ought perhaps to act in such a way as to minimize
them.2 Stephanos Bibas's proposed solutions to the problems of the
plea bargaining system strike me as largely consistent with this
approach. 3 He advocates, for example, a series of reforms designed to
increase the quantity and quality of information available to both
defendants and prosecutors.54 But here, too, there is potential for
mischief. Too much information can trigger yet another aspect of
bounded rationality, namely "information overload," in which case
those presented with more information than they can effectively process
tend to ignore all of it.55
All of this suggests the need for scholarly humility and recognition of
procedure that defines adjudication-a procedure that emphasises the
salience of particulars and hampers judges in discerning the systemic
effects of the interpretive approaches they adopt. The overall picture,
then, is that boundedly rational judges must necessarily adopt some
interpretive decision-procedure or other, on empirical grounds, but
without the necessary information. This is the institutionalist dilemma:
judges cannot escape the enterprise of choosing interpretive decision-
procedures under conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality.
Id.
52. This leads Vermeule to advocate a formalist approach to the interpretation of legal
texts.
The basic idea, only apparently paradoxical, is that judges acting under
conditions of grave uncertainty and bounded rationality should restrict
the range of information they attempt to collect and reduce the
complexity of their behavioral repertoire, on the ground that further
increments of information, complexity, and flexibility produce definite
costs for only speculative gains.
Id. at 5. In a similar vein, Greg Mitchell argues that the uncertainty surrounding the
applicability of the heuristics and biases research to the legal context counsels in favor of what
he terms "do no harm" reforms-that is, reforms designed as much to avoid unintended
consequences as to accomplish their intended end. See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 132.
53. Bibas outlines a series of proposed reforms, some of which are more developed than
others, and some of which (such as "ameliorating the influence of money") are more
aspirational than concrete. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2531-45.
54. Id. at 2531-35.
55. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417-20 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 653,667 (1993).
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the fact that we as scholars are likewise susceptible to the combined
effects of bounded rationality and limited information. The decision
whether to accept an offered plea bargain is complex, requiring the
assessment of a host of variables. Yet it pales in comparison to the
decisions necessary to construct or modify a system in which plea
bargaining takes place.
